Peter – NukewatchUK

Nukewatch reports increase in nuclear weapons transport during 2016

Movements of the United Kingdom’s nuclear weapons increased significantly in 2016 when compared with recent years which suggests that modernised warheads are being introduced into service, according to an annual summary of warhead convoy movements published by Nukewatch (available to download at the bottom of this article).

Evidence from convoy movements observed by Nukewatch is consistent with a programme for loading the first batch of newly modernised warheads on board the Trident submarine HMS Vengeance, which re-entered service during 2016 following a three year refit.

Nukewatch considers that during 2016 at least six loaded convoys travelled between the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) at Burghfield and the Coulport arms depot in Scotland, and at least five loaded convoys travelled in the opposite direction. These are believed to have delivered a total of up to 34 refurbished warheads to Coulport and returned 28 warheads to AWE for modernisation.

Although the total number of convoy movements during the year is similar to the past four to five years, the number of convoys carrying nuclear weapons has more than doubled when compared to previous years, with a corresponding reduction in the number of training exercises.

The pattern of convoy movements observed is consistent with an operation to return warheads equivalent to a single submarine’s complement to AWE for refurbishment. In December 2015 the Trident submarine HMS Vanguard entered Devonport dockyard for a three year refit, prior to which nuclear weapons would have been unloaded from the submarine. At the same time HMS Vengeance left Devonport following a refit, and re-entered service soon after completing a controversial Trident missile test-firing in June 2016, during which an unarmed missile had to be destroyed mid-flight.

Convoy movements suggest that over the first half of the year enough warheads were refurbished by AWE to allow HMS Vengeance to re-enter service in the second half of the year with a largely, if not fully, refurbished complement of warheads.

Production of the modernised and upgraded UK Trident Mark 4A was scheduled to have commenced sometime in 2015 and Nukewatch considers that the convoy movements observed in the first part of 2016 represented an operation to move the first of the Mark 4A upgraded warheads to Coulport prior to loading onto HMS Vengeance.

Over the period 2011 – 2014 a surplus of warheads was returned to AWE when compared with the numbers delivered to Coulport. Nukewatch considers that this is evidence that Trident warheads have been decommissioned at a slow rate in line with a commitment to reduce the number of UK nuclear warheads which was announced in the Strategic Defence and Security Review. Over the last two years this trend has ceased and it appears that there has been a suspension of warhead decommissioning work.

Britain’s nuclear warheads are moved on a regular cycle between the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) in the South of England, where the UK’s nuclear weapons are manufactured and maintained, and the Royal Naval Armaments Depot at Coulport, where warheads are stored prior to deployment on Britain’s Trident submarines. By observing this cycle, it is possible to draw inferences about the level of activity of the UK’s nuclear weapons programme. However, Nukewatch stresses that their figures can only represent an estimate of the true picture.

Jane Tallents of Nukewatch said: “The pattern of warhead convoy movements which we saw last year paints an alarming picture. The evidence suggests that not only are there a greater number of these deadly cargoes on the roads, but that the government is introducing modernised and even more lethal Trident warheads into service.

“While the rest of the world is meeting at the United Nations to draw up a multilateral treaty to ban nuclear weapons, the UK government is unilaterally and illegally modernising its weapons of mass destruction”.

Download annual logs of convoy movements for 2015 and 2016 here:

Convoy log 2015

Convoy log 2016

New report highlights warhead convoy accident record

Convoys which transport the UK’s Trident nuclear warheads have been involved in a series of collisions, breakdowns, and equipment failures, according to a new report by an award-winning journalist.

The report, written by the Sunday Herald’s Rob Edwards and published by the International Campaign for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), puts a spotlight on the safety record of high security convoys which regularly carry nuclear weapons across the UK.

According to previously unpublished information revealed in response to requests made under the Freedom of Information Act, convoys transporting defence nuclear materials and warheads were involved in 24 ‘operational incidents’ and 19 ‘engineering incidents’ over the period January 2013 to July 2016.

Over this period the convoy was involved in three minor collisions: twice in May 2013, when two convoy vehicles collided with each other and when a convoy escort vehicle collided with a parked civilian vehicle, and again in January 2014, when an escort vehicle collided with a car at a Ministry of Defence (MoD) base during a rest stop.

In September 2015 one of the trucks which transports nuclear weapons lost power and broke down soon after leaving a military site, and convoy escort vehicles twice broke down and were declared unserviceable during convoy journeys in November 2013 and July 2015. Adverse weather affected convoy journeys in November 2013, forcing a route change, and in January 2014, when a rolling police blockade was set up to safeguard the convoy during snowy conditions, and the convoy was stopped by protesters on three occasions.

The new revelations bring the total number of reported safety incidents affecting the nuclear convoy since 2000 to 180. This is in addition to eight accidents which are known to have taken place between 1960 and 1991, the most serious of which occurred in January 1987 when a convoy vehicle carrying nuclear warheads skidded and overturned on an icy road in Wiltshire.

The report lists a series of credible accident scenarios that could trigger fires, explosions or a breach of containment, resulting in the release of plutonium and other radioactive materials from warheads. Evidence cited from an MoD report suggests that in extreme circumstances an accident could even trigger an “inadvertent yield” – a nuclear reaction leading to a large-scale release of radiation short of a full nuclear explosion. A terrorist attack on a nuclear convoy, according to the MoD, could cause “considerable loss of life and severe disruption both to the British people’s way of life and to the UK’s ability to function effectively as a sovereign state”.

The report simulates the results of an accident involving a nuclear weapon in five places through which the warhead convoy has travelled: Birmingham, Preston, Wetherby, Newcastle and Glasgow. In each case the people, hospitals, schools, universities, roads, railway stations and airports that could be contaminated and disrupted are identified, assuming that an accident would spread contamination up to ten kilometres from the scene of the crash, depending on which way the wind was blowing.

In Birmingham, for example, a nuclear convoy crash on the M6 at Spaghetti Junction near the city could put more than 1.3 million people at risk of radioactive contamination. Within a ten-kilometre radius there are over 400 schools, 38 railway stations and 18 hospitals that could be disrupted.

The report quotes independent nuclear engineer John Large as warning that a multiple crash and fire involving a warhead carrier would pose a significant – and plausible – risk to the public. “The inclusion of a flammable chemical tanker in the pile-up would add to the ferocity and, particularly if the incident occurred in a longish bridge underpass or similar, fire temperatures would be very demanding on the containment of the warhead carriers,” he said.

If the containment is breached, high explosives could catch fire or explode, he warned. “Once that happens then the enriched uranium and plutonium components will also be consumed by fire and, without effective containment, liberate some very fine plutonium dioxide particles.” The consequences of this would be very hard to mitigate and very long lasting, potentially contaminating significant areas of land and posing long term health impacts.

The report states that although emergency exercises run by the MoD rehearse disaster scenarios in which multiple crashes lead to fires, explosions and the spread of radioactive contamination over cities, post-mortem reports from six exercises reveal that the MoD and the emergency services would have serious difficulties dealing with such disasters. Post-mortems “make the same points year after year”, because many of the same problems keep recurring, suggesting that “lessons are not learnt”, and that “issues with delays, communications and co-ordination are rediscovered every time”, which “does not bode well should there ever be a serious accident”.

Download the ICAN report here.

Nuclear weapons convoy: February 2016

A nuclear weapons convoy left AWE Burghfield in Berkshire on the morning of Wednesday 10 February. After an overnight stop in Yorkshire it travelled on into Scotland on the A1, passing Edinburgh and Stirling before arriving at RNAD Coulport at just before 7.00 pm on Thursday 11 February.

The return trip began on the morning of Monday 15 February, with the convoy passing Stirling before travelling along the Edinburgh Bypass, where it was photographed by a number of members of the public before stopping for a rest break at Glencorse Barracks at Penicuik. It then continued along the A1 past Newcastle before stopping overnight again in Yorkshire. The convoy arrived back at AWE Burghfield early evening on Tuesday 16 February.

MoD side-steps nuclear transport hazard warning regulations

Hazard warning labels are visible on this MoD High Security Vehicle photographed in 2011. The labels are no longer carried by replacement vehicles.

A secret decision to exempt Ministry of Defence (MoD) nuclear transport arrangements from hazard warning legislation has been revealed as a result of questioning by Members of Parliament.

Ministers have admitted that it is “not current Ministry of Defence policy” to display radioactive material hazard signs on the special trucks used to transport military special nuclear materials or nuclear warheads. Until recently MoD vehicles transporting special nuclear materials carried hazard warning signs when transporting radioactive cargoes, but this policy has now been quietly abandoned.

MoD claims that the change is needed to maintain its policy to ‘neither conform nor deny’ the presence of nuclear weapons at a particular location – but campaigners claim that the department is placing nuclear secrecy before measures the protection of public safety.

The change in practice was disclosed in the reply to a Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asked by Labour MP Paul Flynn.

Further questions from the Scottish National Party’s Owen Thompson have revealed that a decision to cease displaying radioactive material hazard warning signs on vehicles carrying special nuclear materials was made by the Defence Equipment and Support organisation in July 2011.

Penny Mordaunt, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, said that the change was implemented in 2012 in anticipation of the transition to a single type of vehicle for the transport of both nuclear weapons and special nuclear materials and was needed “in order to maintain the policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons”

The Minister claimed that MoD’s arrangements for the transport of defence nuclear materials “include the provision of information to the emergency services in the event of an incident; this does not rely on displaying radioactive material hazard warning signs”.

Jane Tallents of Nukewatch warned that under the new arrangements public safety was taking second place to secrecy.

“Although the Ministry of Defence say they inform police when nuclear convoys are on the road, they have repeatedly refused to tell fire services, the ambulance service, or local council emergency planners about convoy movements”, she said.

“If one of these convoys is involved in an accident, would fire-fighters
arriving first on the scene have to wait until police turned up to find out that they were dealing with a highly hazardous radioactive cargo rather than a
normal road traffic accident?

“Although some members of the convoy crew are trained as medics and fire-fighters, their priority is looking after the convoy and its weapons, not the public.

“The Ministry of Defence is putting secrecy about its nuclear weapons
before the safety of the general public, who it is supposed to be protecting. That can never be right”.

Throughout most of the 1990s and 2000s special nuclear materials, nuclear warhead components, and other sensitive loads were carried by special ‘High Security Vehicles’ operated by the Atomic Weapons Establishment. As civilian vehicles, these were obliged to comply with hazard warning regulations and carry warning signs when transporting radioactive materials, explosives, or hazardous chemicals.

Over the same period nuclear weapons were transported separately in their own vehicles by the armed forces, who were able to claim exemption from displaying hazard warnings on their vehicles.

In the mid-2000s the transport of all nuclear cargoes, both special nuclear materials and warheads, was contracted out by MoD to the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), and both cargoes are now carried by a single type of vehicle – the Truck Cargo Heavy Duty (TCHD) Mark 3 lorry. The TCHD trucks are operated by AWE, acting in the capacity of a civilian haulier which would not normally be exempt from hazard labelling regulations.

Despite ministerial policy that MoD should operate to safety standards at least as good as those required by legislation, the department has decided to exempt itself from this area of public protection legislation.

MoD has said that legal advice was sought and the regulator was notified before the decision to cease displaying hazard warning signs was made.

Nuclear weapons convoy: January 2016

The first warhead convoy of the year left AWE Burghfield just after midnight on Saturday 9 January, arriving at RNAD Coulport at around 7.00 pm on the same day. The convoy was followed by Nukewatch up the M40 and on to the A46 past Coventry, and then back on to the motorway network on the M6 to Stafford. The convoy continued north on the M6, stopping to change crew near Preston, and then drove into Scotland on the M74. At Stirling it was greeted by protesters, including students from Stirling University. Despite efforts by police to prevent people from photographing the convoy, a number of members of the public have posted video footage on the internet showing the convoy during its journey.

The return trip took place a week later, with the convoy leaving Coulport at around 10.00 am on Saturday 16 January. It again passed through Stirling and then travelled on the M80 past Glasgow in heavy snow. It arrived back at Burghfield early in the morning on Sunday 17 January.

Nuclear weapons convoy: December 2015

A nuclear warhead convoy left AWE Burghfield on Wednesday 2nd December at 8.30 am, arriving at RNAD Coulport at around 2.30 am the next morning. Passing through Reading it then travelled East on the M4, subsequently taking the A1(M) to travel northwards.

At 3.25 p.m. Nukewatchers spotted the convoy turning off the A1(M) onto the A61 in North Yorkshire, heading for a break at RAF Leeming which it entered at 3.45 p.m. By 8 p.m. the convoy was observed leaving the A1 onto the A69, 9 minutes later entering Albemarle Barracks in Northumbria (10 miles west of Newcastle-upon-Tyne) for another break. Later, continuing West on the A69, the convoy made its way to the M74 and was observed by Nukewatchers at several points on its trip northwards through Scotland. It then took the M8 around the southside of Glasgow where it was caught on video by Scottish CND. After crossing the Erskine Bridge it continued up Loch Lomondside, reaching its destination at around 2.30 am.

The convoy was thought to have returned to the Atomic Weapons Establishment by 11th December.

Convoy movements picture remains steady during 2014

Nukewatch has published our analysis of nuclear weapons convoy movements for the year 2014 (available to download below).

We consider that during 2014 at least three loaded convoys travelled between the Coulport nuclear arms depot in Scotland and the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) at Burghfield in Berkshire, and two loaded convoys travelled in the opposite direction. We estimate that between two and twelve nuclear warheads were dispatched to AWE and between two and eight warheads returned to Coulport. Our best guess is that nine warheads were dispatched to AWE and six were returned to Coulport.

The overall picture of convoy movements during the year represents a similar level of activity than over the last year and is consistent with general observations over the past three to four years. The level of convoy activity continues to remain consistent with the baseline necessary to allow the movement of nuclear weapons for maintenance and surveillance purposes, with a slow rate of return of warheads to AWE for decommissioning.

Convoy exercise activities are also thought to have taken place frequently throughout the year. This is a higher number of exercises than in recent previous years, and may be the result of training required to introduce new convoy personnel members or escort arrangements, or preparation for an increase in the tempo of convoy operations over the months ahead.

Download the 2014 warhead movements log here:

Convoy log 2014

Trident warhead decommissioning continues at a slow pace, says Nukewatch

Movements of the United Kingdom’s nuclear warhead arsenal continue at a baseline level and suggest that decommissioning of warheads from the Trident warhead stockpile is slowly taking place, according to an annual summary of warhead convoy movements for the year 2013 published by the Nukewatch network (available to download at the bottom of this article).

Evidence from convoy movements observed by Nukewatch is consistent with a programme for decommissioning around three warheads per year between 2011 and 2025 to bring the UK’s total warhead stockpile down from around 225 warheads to around 180 warheads, as the government committed to do in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review.

However, Nukewatch stresses that sustained monitoring over future years will be necessary to confirm this.

Nukewatch is a network of individuals which monitors the UK’s nuclear weapons programme by observing the road transport of nuclear weapons, and has been watching and tracking warhead convoys for over 25 years.

The group considers that during 2013 at least two ‘live’ warhead convoys travelled between the Coulport nuclear arms depot in Scotland and the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) at Burghfield in Berkshire, most likely dispatching four warheads to AWE for maintenance, surveillance, or decommissioning, and returning two warheads to Coulport.

Nukewatch reports that the overall picture of convoy movements during the year represents a slightly lower level of activity than over the last year, but is consistent with a minimum baseline level observed over the past few years. During the 1990s and early 2000s warheads were transported across the country on a far more regular basis as the Trident programme was implemented and older warheads were returned to AWE for decommissioning.

As well as ‘live’ convoy movements, Nukewatch notes that convoy exercises and training activities also took place during 2013, and a number of special nuclear materials convoys were observed.

2013 TCHD WARHEAD CONVOY LOG