Category: Nukewatch

The increase in warhead numbers announced in the recent Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development, and Foreign Policy has already commenced and may even be nearing completion, according to an analysis by Nukewatch of nuclear warhead convoy journeys conducted over the last decade.

In March 2021, as part of the Integrated Review, the government announced that the UK will move to an overall nuclear weapon stockpile of no more than 260 warheads. Nukewatch has prepared a technical note to explain the announcement in the Integrated Review in the light of our monitoring of warhead convoy movements between the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) in Berkshire, where they are manufactured and serviced, and the Royal Naval Armaments Depot in Coulport in Scotland, whether they are stored.

Our analysis shows that in the first part of the decade (2010 – 2015) there was a slow but steady reduction in numbers of warheads in the UK warhead stockpile held at Coulport. However, from 2015-6 onwards this trend is reversed, and there has been a net transfer of warheads from AWE to Coulport, resulting in an increase in the stockpile held by the Royal Navy. There has been a marked upturn in the rate of delivery of warheads from AWE to Coulport over the past two years, 2019 and 2020.

Nukewatch believes the initial reduction in warhead numbers can be explained by measures to bring the UK warhead stockpile to below 180, as pledged in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review by the then Conservative – Liberal Democrat government. From around 2015/16 AWE commenced delivery of the Mk4A upgrade of the UK Trident warhead to the Royal Navy, and increases in the stockpile observed since 2015-16 represent deliveries of newly manufactured Mk4A warheads. Assuming a 2010 baseline of 225 warheads in the stockpile, on the basis of our assessment Nukewatch estimates that the UK warhead stockpile had grown to around 250 warheads by December 2020.

Read the full details here.

East Lothian, 11th July 2019

Nukewatch has welcomed aspects of a Scottish Government review of the preparedness of the civil authorities in Scotland to respond effectively to an incident involving the transportation by road of UK nuclear warheads, but is still far from reassured.

 

Following the publication of the Nukewatch Report “Unready Scotland” which highlighted the dangers of the traffic and the poor level of awareness and readiness at local authority level, Mark Ruskell MSP initiated a members’ debate in Holyrood in May 2018. At the conclusion of the debate Annabelle Ewing, the then Minister for Community Safety, indicated her intention to ask the Police and Fire and Rescue Services to conduct a preparedness review., after making the point that reassurance was necessary. The report on this review is now available.

For Nukewatch Jane Tallents said:

“We are glad to see that the review exercise has been very broad in its scope, has prompted a good deal of agency awareness of the problem, has already led to the tightening of some procedures and prompted helpful recommendations. We cannot help but note that such a review would not have happened without persistent pressure over the years from Nukewatch and the support of individual parliamentarians.

There are however a number of critical flaws in the review. The agencies concerned have been all too ready to accept without due diligence statements from the UK Ministry of Defence, without engaging with other recognised expertise, as we had recommended. This is especially true on the question of risk assessment. The MoD’s single factor risk assessment – that the likelihood of an incident is remote is accepted without any mention of the second factor in any standard risk assessment, the potential severity of consequence. The review also fails to register adequately the unique hazards posed by the transport, and relies too heavily on generic emergency responses.

There is also no mention of the increase in public concern about the convoys. For those living near Faslane/Coulport there is the Clyde Emergency plan which at least gives basic information to the public about how to act in case of an incident. Also, fixed nuclear sites are governed by the REPPIR regulations. Astonishingly, the review does not deal with the fact that no such such framework exists for the convoys. Members of the public who are aware of the convoys need practical information about what to do in the case of an actual accident to keep them and their families safe. This review does not give this information or indicate where it might be found or accessed.

It is most disappointing that Ash Denham, the current Minister, has endorsed the review in her introduction and given the false impression that all is well. The Scottish Government has a prime responsibility for the safety of citizens and must recognise that this case is far from closed.”

A post exercise report from the Director of the MOD convoy accident exercise Astral Climb in 2016 reveals that the scenario used was unrealistic and the whole exercise appeared more about ticking boxes than testing any preparedness to protect the public.

This nuclear transport emergency response  exercise was conducted on Wed 22 June 2016 at the closed Longannet Power Station, Fife in Scotland.

The Directors report was obtained under a Freedom Of Information request submitted 30.3.2017 and  received 24.5.2019 and it states that “The exercise was planned to test and demonstrate the Command and Control activities of the MOD Road Convoy Immediate Response Force (IRF) and to demonstrate their integration with the responding Civilian Emergency Services (CES).”

Exercise Planning was led by Nuclear Emergency Organisation & supported by AWE staff and planning meetings were held with the Scottish Multi Agency Resilience Training and Exercising Unit (SMARTEU).

The scenario was that a convoy having been diverted from its usual route (presumably the A1) is on the A199. As it approaches the junction with the A198 the driver of an HGV loses control and emerges from the junction into the path on the oncoming convoy. It collides with the third warhead carrier. 2 private cars and a small van were also involved.

This location is on a side road parallel to and about 50m from the A1 between West Barns and East Linton to the West of Dunbar. To our knowledge the convoy has never been on this road. The prevailing wind would conveniently blow any radioactive release across a few fields and out to sea. There are very few dwellings in the area although any change of wind direction would send a radioactive cloud over East Linton, Dunbar and a number of small villages in the area. The convoy travels through heavy traffic and urban areas on motorways.  Why wasn’t the scenario an accident on the M74 in Glasgow, or the M9 in Stirling or the Edinburgh city bypass so that protecting and warning  large numbers of people could be tested?

Although in the scenario the warhead is “disrupted” and partially explodes causing a release of radiation the Directors report states that “It was accepted by all agencies participating that the energy involved in such a collision would not be sufficient to cause a release of radioactive material and that the scenario was only being used to facilitate play”.

If the purpose of an exercise is to test the response to a nuclear warhead convoy accident then using a scenario that they can claim would not release radiation seems to show more concern for reducing negative publicity than protecting the public.

Even though the scenario being “played” was with a radioactive release there then appears to be no further reference to it apart from some people going on a Radioactive Materials Emergency Response Course in advance and that  “The convoy decontamination was thorough. CES were processed as well as convoy personel”. There is no mention of protection of the public ie no efforts to warn people to shelter and take cover, or evacuate residents from the emergency zone.  It’s not clear what modelling was done as part of the exercise to predict how the radioactive plume would spread.

The report says some responders were wearing just a paper face mask and that contamination levels close to the truck would be too high for this to be effective. However, the next point states that there are problems with communications when personnel have to wear respirators. There is no mention of whether members of the public ie casualties were given any kind of protection.  

Command and control was established within 40 minutes: this seems a bit of a long time given that the convoy control vehicle is more or less on scene from the start.

Scottish Fire and Rescue deployed within 26 minutes – this sounds pretty good but we have no idea how far they had to travel or the extent to which they were pre-notified.

There were the usual problems with communications. The police couldn’t understand the convoy commander due to the respirator. Some previous problems were solved by giving the convoy crew a Scottish fire service radio.

Restrictions on the use of radios was not adequately briefed. This  this could potentially be a serious issue.  Mobile phones are banned in explosives handling areas (eg RAF Welford) as they are a detonation risk.  There is research from the US that when nuclear weapons are fire damaged electric currents can flow through them in all kind of weird ways, so this may potentially be a safety concern if it could trigger the explosive to go off.

The MoD Co-ordinating Authority Executive Team were prepositioned before the exercise.  This is the main source of MoD expertise on site for dealing with an accident.  Given that it took them around 5 hours to get the team up from Bath for Senator 11, prepositioning the team is ‘cheating’ in a big way and raises a very serious question about how realistic the exercise was.

It does not appear that any actual nuclear warhead convoy vehicles were present at the exercise. An HGV and some cars were used losing any sense of a real situation with a 23 vehicle convoy with some uniquely constructed vehicles included.

Although the main objective was demonstrating a satisfactory response and the secondary objective was to provide training, at times it reads more like the exercises was mainly a training activity for Emergency Services  than an assessed challenge.

Conclusion from Nukewatch

The MOD are now conducting nuclear weapons convoy accident exercises which don’t even pretend to test  any measures to protect the public from a radiation release. In the past more realistic exercise scenarios still stopped short of actual evacuation and sheltering of the public but at least played out on paper how that might be done. For Astral Climb 2016 the MOD imagined a convoy on a back road (it never uses) nowhere near any population centres and they involved police and fire officers  without even having  any convoy vehicles present at the exercise.  Nukewatch can only conclude that the MOD itself realise that a robust test of emergency procedures would always show that the public would be put at risk and therefore they have moved to an annual box ticking exercise with the minimum of information being released to the public. 

The Scottish Government which observed this exercise and the Emergency Services that took part should be calling for more transparency about arrangements for protecting the public and speaking out if those are not in place. The scenarios for future exercises should be set by the regulators and civil emergency services to ensure that they are realistic and challenging. Of course the best way to protect the public is to stop transporting nuclear warheads on our roads altogether.

Article in the Ferret

Press release
The Scottish government expects that the review it has commissioned on the readiness of the Scottish civil authorities to respond to an incident involving the transport by road of nuclear warheads will be published early in 2019.

The indication comes in a letter to Nukewatch from the office of Community Safety Minister Ash Denham. In May of this year Denham’s predecessor, Annabelle Ewing, at the close of a parliamentary debate on the issue, promised that a review of the arrangements would be sought from police and fire service inspectorates.

The letter, in response to a query from Nukewatch about the timing of the review, also says:

“It is important to all those engaged in the preparedness review that it is comprehensive in nature, as open and transparent as possible and culminates in a publicly available report, within a reasonable timescale.”

For Nukewatch David Mackenzie said:

“Our 2017 report Unready Scotland ended with the recommendation that SCOTGOV should conduct just such a review and we are pleased at the progress that is being made. Transparency is vital over an issue of such public concern and at a time of growing awareness of the threats to safety posed by the transport of nuclear warheads. Each and every SCOTGOV minister has signed the ICAN parliamentary pledge to work for the new UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and facing up to the grim realities of the warhead transport is a good step towards compliance with the Treaty’s requirements.”

Report from Members Debate in Holyrood – 2 May 2018. 

Civil Contingency in Nuclear Weapon Transport. 

Yesterday for over an hour the Scottish Parliament discussed nuclear weapons convoys in a debate raised by Mark Ruskell MSP from the Scottish Greens. It was a member’s debate which comes after decision time so most members leave then but 22 stayed to listen and contribute.

Mark Ruskell introduced the motion and thanked David Mackenzie and Jane Tallents for the Unready Scotland report and paid tribute to the work of the Nukewatch network. He explained why the hazards of nuclear weapons transport are so unique and how the results of a survey of Scottish Local Authorities by him which showed that none of them had conducted risk assessments or informed the public.  He said that the current devolution settlement laid responsibility for community safety with the Scottish Government under the Civil Contingencies Act 2014 and called for them to hold a review of civil authorities plans for a convoy accident.

Bill Kidd (SNP) said no one should be ignorant of what these convoys carry and called for the minister to consider setting up a group to conduct a review.

Edward Mountain, Conservative, set out a number of facts as he saw them.  Basically be believes that the warheads are safe to transport, security is high, contingency plans are in place and all civil authorities are consulted before a convoy begins its journey.

Claudia Beamish from Labour said she was concerned about the failure of local authorities to ensure compliance with the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and she called on the Minister to highlight how civilian partnerships were interlinked and she called for a review.

Clare Haughey (SNP), Gordon MacDonald (SNP), Bruce Crawford (SNP) and Tom Arthur (SNP)  all spoke about concerns about convoys through or near to their constituencies, made lots of good points and called for action from the Minister.

Maurice Cory (Con) said that the public has nothing to fear and in an incident the convoy commander would take charge. He did however commend to the Minister that she look at the exercises around Faslane as an example of informing the public and progress that elsewhere.

Ross Greer (Green) said that a warhead in transit equates to the most powerful and dangerous dirty bomb imaginable and that all public bodies that are Category One Responders should be prepared. He hoped that the debate would prompt councils to live up to their responsibilities.

 At the end Annabelle Ewing, Minister for Community Safety and Legal Affairs, replied for the government.

She said that the three resilience partnerships regularly undertake a risk and preparedness assessment process which enables them to identify and assess the main risks that are relevant to their regions and determine how prepared they are to deal with the consequences of those risks. In response to an intervention from Mark Ruskell she said that those specifically include assessment and planning regarding nuclear convoys.

However she said she would write to HM Inspectorate of the Constabulary and HM Fire Service Inspectorate in Scotland to request a joint review of the resilience work of Police Scotland and the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service to look at “how they work with local authorities and the other responders in Scotland’s regional resilience partnerships to ensure that response arrangements are indeed up to date and current, because we all want to have that assurance.”

The full transcript is available at http://www.parliament.scot/parliamentarybusiness/report.aspx?r=11499

Unready Scotland Report available here

Nukewatch comment. We are very pleased that the Scottish Parliament spent an hour discussing our concerns about the risks of nuclear weapons convoys on our roads and the lack of public information about any emergency plans to deal with a serious incident. It is encouraging to see how many MSPs are well informed and truly represent their constituents by calling for a review of the arrangements that would be in place should the worst happen. The Ministers request that Police Scotland and the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service conduct a review is progress and may ultimately lead to greater awareness of nuclear weapons transport and the risks involved.

There are still many questions and much work to do. 

Press articles:

Scotsman

Common Space

The motion “Civil Contingency in Nuclear Weapon Transport” lodged by Mark Ruskell MSP will be debated in Holyrood next Wednesday, May 2nd at 5pm. See full text below.

Although as a Members Debate it won’t result in a vote Mark will speak about the Nukewatch report UNREADY SCOTLAND and our request to the Scottish Government to conduct an open review of civil authorities readiness to respond to a serious accident with a nuclear weapon in transit.

The report arose from a survey that Mark Ruskell’s office conducted of local authorities that convoys pass through. The results showed the woeful lack of emergency planning for an accident with such a unique cargo – high explosives combined with radioactive material including plutonium. They seemed content to leave public safety in the hands of the MOD although it’s clear that the MOD would expect first responders including councils to take care of the public including evacuations and disseminating advice to take shelter.

We have already sent the report to all MSPs on convoy routes but to have this information formally put on record in the Holyrood chamber is important. The Minister for Business, Innovation and Energy, Paul Wheelhouse MSP will respond at the end of the debate.

If you live in Scotland please can you ask your MSPs to sign the motion and attend the debate. You can see if the convoys travel through your area by looking at the Council areas mentioned in the motion. Support from any MSP’s is helpful but it would be especially valuable if those whose constituents are put at risk by the transport of nuclear weapons could go to the debate and contribute. Hearing from you would encourage that.

It would be great to see a good attendance in the public gallery. You can book a ticket online 

Or let us know you want to attend and we can meet you in the main lobby at 4.30pm with tickets.

Mark Ruskell is booking a room where we can discuss what was said afterwards and have some refreshments. Please let us know if you want to join us.

Find out more about  UNREADY SCOTLAND and read the full report  here. 

Jane Tallents and David Mackenzie for Nukewatch.

 

Motion S5M-11539: Mark Ruskell, Mid Scotland and Fife, Scottish Green Party, Date Lodged: 09/04/2018

Civil Contingency in Nuclear Weapon Transport

That the Parliament understands that the Ministry of Defence regularly transports nuclear weapons on public roads in convoys that pass through or close to communities in the Argyll and Bute, Dumfries and Galloway, East Dunbartonshire, East Lothian, Edinburgh, Falkirk, Glasgow, Midlothian, North Lanarkshire, Renfrewshire, Scottish Borders, Stirling, South Lanarkshire, West Dunbartonshire and West Lothian local authority areas; believes that there is an inherent risk in transporting high explosives and radioactive material together on public roads; understands that information on what to do in an emergency involving a nuclear reactor is regularly circulated to residents close to the Coulport and Faslane bases but that no equivalent information relating to an incident involving nuclear weapons is available to communities along the regular convoy route; believes that although defence is a reserved matter, it would be for the civil authorities such as police, fire and rescue and local authorities to attempt to respond to any emergency as so-called category 1 responders, and notes the view that these civil authorities must have sufficient assessments and plans in place to respond.

Check here so see if your MSPs have signed it.

 

Nukewatch welcomes this open letter to John Swinney supporting our request for a review into the civil authorities preparedness to cope with a serious nuclear convoy accident in the report UNREADY SCOTLAND. The replies we have received so far from Paul Wheelhouse Minister for Business, Innovation and Energy can be seen here.

Wednesday, April 4, 2018

An open letter to John Swinney, Deputy First Minister with responsibility for Resilience

Dear Mr Swinney

I am writing on behalf of Scottish CND to share our concern about the continuing and regular transport of the UK’s nuclear weapons on Scottish roads. Our objection to this traffic is twofold. The movement by road of nuclear warheads is a key part of the UK’s horrifying and illegal Trident nuclear weapon system. The transport also presents immediate and unacceptable risks to the communities through which the nuclear weapon convoys pass, risks which the UK Ministry of Defence itself acknowledges and attempts to justify as acceptable in order to maintain the Trident system. Our concern has been heightened by the publication of the Nukewatch report “Unready Scotland” and the disappointing response of the Scottish government to its findings (REPORT link). The report has highlighted a general unreadiness on the part of Scottish local authorities on convoy routes to respond effectively to a serious incident, in terms of their duties under the Civil Contingencies Act (2004). The report noted in particular a general failure to conduct appropriate risk assessments of the threat posed by the traffic and a complete failure to make and keep their public informed, both of which are statutory duties under the Act. While accepting that defence is reserved to Westminster and that the conduct of the convoys is a UK government responsibility, the report has recommended that the Scottish government conducts a review into the readiness of the relevant civil authorities in Scotland to effectively fulfil their statutory part following any serious incident. To date the Scottish government has not acceded to this request. Scottish CND supports the Nukewatch request for a review as a sensible and appropriate step forward. Meanwhile there are strong indications that the new UN Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is already having a significant impact in advance of its entry into force. Since the adoption of the Treaty, 30 financial institutions have ceased investing in nuclear weapon producers. At UN level ICAN is reliably advised that the nuclear-armed states, including the United Kingdom, are feeling the challenge that the Treaty poses to their nuclear weapon status. The treaties banning chemical weapons, cluster munitions and landmines have led the way in changing the norm around these inhumane weapons, and there are signs that the nuclear ban treaty is beginning to have the same effect.

We are delighted that a majority of Scottish parliamentarians, including the entire Scottish government, have signed the ICAN Parliamentary Pledge to work for the advancement of the TPNW. Scotland has a unique position as a significant section of a nuclear-armed state which at both popular and parliamentary level rejects that state’s possession of these WMD. This is recognised worldwide. In that context it is vital that all reasonable and constitutionally viable steps be taken to align with the Treaty.

One such step is the modest one recommended by Nukewatch. Scottish CND commends it to you.

Yours sincerely,

Jean Anderson

Scottish CND Secretary

On behalf of the Executive Committee